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INTRODUCTION 
This Reply Brief first contains a detailed review of the accuracy of the allegations 
in Appellee's Brief ("Jim's Brief) regarding whether Appellant's Opening Brief ("Rita's 
Brief) left out (or failed to marshal) important facts, it then also reviews the accuracy of 
several other assertions made in Jim's Brief After countering Jim's assertion that Rita's 
Exhibit 50 (Appendix B) was controverted at trial, and his assertion that the 2003 Ford 
Credit Application (Appendix C) was not before the Trial Court, this Reply Brief next 
counter's Jim's argument that the Trial Court properly chose not to consider these two 
documents explains why the Trial Court should have recognized them as corroborative of 
Rita's trial testimony, as reflected in her Exhibit 22 (Appendix A), causing the Trial Court 
to follow Rita's Exhibit 22 instead of the contents of the 2004 Credit Application when 
determining the amount of pre-separation unpaid earnings that Rita was owed by her 
parents' Trust. Finally, in reply to the primary thesis of Jim's Brief, this Reply Brief 
finishes with a policy discussion about how much a divorce litigant should be punished 
for not having been candid during the discovery phase of the litigation, followed by a 
brief showing as to why Jim should not be awarded attorney fees on this appeal regardless 
of the Court's decisions on the merits of the issues presented in Rita's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. With a Few Minor and/or Arguable Exceptions, Rita's Opening Brief Does 
Not Omit or Fail to Marshal Any Facts Relevant to this Appeal. 
Jim's Brief asserts some 34 paragraphs that supposedly contain "key facts . . . not 
clearly stated or omitted completely by [Rita's Brief]." Jim's Brief at 5. At the outset, it 
1 
should be pointed out that Rita's Brief concedes for purposes of this appeal the Trial 
Court's finding that she "knowingly and repeatedly lied in her [financial declarations] and 
during her deposition[]" with respect to her expectation of future payment for the services 
she provided to her parents and their Trust prior to the parties' separation on May 10, 
2005; and, therefore, that Rita's "testimony utterly lacks credibility and should be given 
weight only to the extent there is corroborating evidence to support it." See Rita's Brief 
at 17, citing and quoting from R. at 1706 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order at [^10 & n.3). Thus, this issue is not before the Court and there is no need to 
repeatedly cite to parts of the Record that support this finding. That said, the "key facts" 
asserted by Jim Brief as being either "not clearly stated" or "omitted completely" by 
Rita's Brief are discussed ad seriatim as follows: 
1. Rita's Brief points out at least three times the Trial Court's findings in 
Paragraph 10 and footnote 3 of its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. at 
1706), with respect to Rita's lack of credibility at trial based on its subsidiary finding that 
she had been untruthful and evasive earlier in the proceedings. See Rita's Brief at 10 
fl[24 of Statement of Relevant Facts), 17 (quoted extensively after marshaling evidence 
supporting Trial Court's imputation of $3,800.00 per month in income to Rita starting 
July 1, 1998), and 42-43 (quoted extensively). Moreover, in light of Rita's concession, 
continued citation to this finding, and to the subsidiary findings that support it, it is both 
superfluous and redundant. 
2. Rita's Brief clearly points out and concedes her prior lack of candor during 
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the discovery conducted by Jim's attorney. See, e.g., Rita's Brief at 16-17. Again, 
superfluous and redundant. 
3. Same as paragraph 2. 
4. Jim's Brief misstates the Record on the issue of when Rita changed her 
position that she was not entitled to payment from the Trust. Page 140, lines 1 through 4 
of the Trial Transcript states: "Q: And that's been your position, consistent, up until about 
less than a week ago, correct? Or a month ago, whenever this accounting happened, 
correct? A: Yes." R. at 2027, Tr. p. 140 Ins. 1-4. Thus, Rita admitted to having changed 
her position about being entitled to payment from the Trust at or about the time she 
created and submitted to her mother the accounting of unpaid earnings that is contained in 
her Exhibit 22, which was done prior to June 2008, see R. at 2027, Tr. p. 137 ln.24 to 
p. 138 In. 17, and not "approximately one week before the beginning of trial" on August 4, 
2008. Jim's Brief at 6, f4. It is true, however, that the disclosure of Rita's change in 
position to Jim's counsel did not occur until the production of Rita's Exhibit 22 several 
days before trial. From the Record, this appears to have occurred not later than July 21, 
2008. See R. at 1646, 1648 (Rita's Exhibit List identifying Exhibit 22 as "Claim for 
Services" with Certificate of Service showing date of mailing of July 21, 2009). 
5. The part of the Trial Transcript cited in Jim's Brief refers to Rita's failure to 
disclose her bank accounts in her first Financial Declaration. See R. at 2027, Tr. p. 140 
ln.5 to p. 142 ln.4. Rita's Brief points out the incompleteness of her Financial 
Declarations at least four times. See Rita's Brief at 16, 17, 42 & 43. Again, after Rita's 
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concession that she "lied" in her financial declarations, this superfluous and redundant. 
6. Same as paragraph 2. See Rita's Brief at 16 ("Rita . . . 'was not frank5 with 
Jim's counsel 'many times' during her prior deposition . . . . " "Rita . . . 'lied repeated 
times' . . . in her prior deposition 'to get what [she] wanted].").1 Superfluous/redundant. 
7. Of course Rita admitted on cross examination that she was employed by her 
parents' Trust from 2000 to 2006, she had just finished testifying on direct examination 
that she had been working for her parent's Trust since October 2000; that she was 
supposed to be paid $12 per hour, plus 10% of the rentals starting in 2001; that she had 
been paid some early on, but that the Trust had not had sufficient liquidity to pay her for 
quite some time; and that she currently had a claim against the Trust for unpaid earnings. 
This is clearly pointed out in Rita's Brief. See Rita's Brief at 6-8 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts 
1fl|13, 15-19) and citations to the Record therein. 
8. Rita absolutely did not ever take the position that all monies she received 
from her parents' Trust were gifts, and the Trial Court did not so find. See R. at 2027, Tr. 
p. 144 Ins. 11-23 {quoting from prior deposition transcript: "Q: 'All right, so let me see if I 
1
 But see, R. at 2028, Tr. p.232 Ins. 8-14 (Rita explains that she took the position in 
her deposition that she wasn't "employed" by the Trust because her understanding was 
that to be an "employee" meant that you were being paid, which she wasn't.). Rita never 
denied performing work for her parents and their Trust during the relevant period, see, 
e.g., R. at 2027, Tr. p.144 Ins. 1-4, 11-23 {quoting from prior deposition transcript), or 
that she had been at least partially paid for her work early on. R. at 2027, Tr. p. 144 
Ins. 11-23 {again quoting from prior deposition transcript: "Q: 'All right, so let me see if I 
understand this then. You have done things for your family? A: I've helped my family. 
Q: And then they give you gifts, is that what you're telling us? A: No. Q: No, correct me 
then, what, what, when you do things for your family, how are you compensated? A: 
There was some money gave to me for awhile there, and it stopped.'"). 
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understand this then. You have done things for your family? A: I've helped my family. 
Q: And then they give you gifts, is that what you're telling us? A: No. Q: No, correct me 
then, what, what, when you do things for your family, how are you compensated? A: 
There was some money gave to me for awhile there, and it stopped.'"). This part of her 
deposition testimony was consistent with her testimony at trial. 
9. Jim's Brief makes an inference here that is not warranted from the Record. 
The part of the deposition transcript quoted from on the bottom of page 144 and the top of 
page 145 of the Trial Transcript does not indicate that it is referring to Rita not being paid 
for working for her parents. See R. at 2027, Tr. p.144 ln.24 to p.145 ln.10. Rita had just 
testified at page 36 of the deposition transcript that she was paid for some of the work that 
she'd done for her family early on. From the Record it is unclear what other "work" 
might be referred to on deposition transcript page 37, which is what is being discussed at 
the bottom of Trial Transcript page 144 and the top of 145. See R. at 2027, Tr. p. 143 
ln.20 to p.145 ln.10. Moreover, there is absolutely no reference in the portion of the 
Record cited by Jim's Brief to the effect that Rita started working for her parents in 1998. 
The only part of the Record that supports this proposition is the 2004 Ford Credit 
Application (Jim's Exhibit 28), which was referred to repeatedly in Rita's Brief. See, 
e.g.. Rita's Brief at 8 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts ^|20), 15-16 (marshaling), 18 n.7, 20 & 24. 
10. Jim's Brief somewhat misstates Rita's testimony on cross examination and 
completely ignores her explanation on redirect that, although she did not keep a time 
sheet with her hours on it every day, she did keep other contemporaneous records that 
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permitted her to reconstruct her hours, and that it is these reconstructed hours that are 
reflected in her Exhibit 22. R. at 2028? Tr. p.236 ln.22 to p.237 In. 10. The fact that Rita 
acknowledged that she had to reconstruct the hours reflected in her Exhibit 22 is referred 
to by the Trial Court at footnote 4 of its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
as are the physical characteristics of Rita's Exhibit 22 (i.e., that it is undated, unsigned 
and mostly handwritten) at Paragraph 13 thereof. See R. at 1707. Arguably, by 
undermining the credibility of Rita's Exhibit 22, these subsidiary facts support the Trial 
Court's finding that Rita had unpaid earnings of $3,800.00 per month going back to July 
1, 1998. To the extent that this is true, counsel apologizes for not having included them 
in the Statement of Relevant Facts and in the initial marshaling in Rita's Brief, and 
requests that the Court include these facts in its consideration as so stated and marshaled. 
11. Rather than a statement of fact supported by a citation to the Record, in this 
paragraph Jim's Brief argues for the first time on appeal that Rita's accounting of her 
unpaid earnings (Rita's Exhibit 22) is suspicious based on the actual hours she reported.2 
There is nothing in the Record that raises this issue or that even suggests that it was at all 
contemplated by the Trial Court, and this Court should decline to consider this argument 
on that basis. Rita's Brief makes reference to her Exhibit 22 many times with citations to 
the Record where it can be found. It is beyond the scope of appellate review to speculate 
2
 Had Jim's counsel examined Rita regarding the hours she claimed for March and 
the first week of April 2001, he would have learned that during this time she was on a 
remote assignment away from her home managing a motel for her parents where she was 
required to be either working, or at least on call, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. 
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as to how each and every minute detail of an exhibit might have affected a trial court's 
decision absent some indication in the record that the trial court actually did consider it. 
12. Rita's Brief sets forth this exact same question and answer exchange on its 
page 16 (marshaling). Rita's Brief also generally addresses Rita's prior lack of candor 
with Jim's counsel at least three other times on pages 16, 17 and 43. 
13. Rita's Brief acknowledges that she "lied" to Ford Credit to get a loan in 
numerous places. See, e.g., Rita's Brief at 9 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts at ^ 22), 12, 16 
(marshaling), 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 43, 44. 
14. Rita's Brief acknowledges this admission at least three times. See Rita's 
Brief at 16 (marshaling), 17,43. 
15. Again, Rita's Brief refers to this part of Paragraph 10 of the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at least twice. See Rita's Brief at 10 
(Stmt, of Rel. Facts at f24)5 17. 
16. Rita's Brief refers to the fact that she testified that she's a co-trustee of her 
mother's Trust at least five times. See Rita's Brief at 6 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts at Tfl3.e.), 22-
23 & n. 11, 28 (marshaling), 29 n.18 (marshaling). 
17. Rita's Brief discusses her confusion about when she actually became a co-
trustee at least three times. See Rita's Brief at 23 n. 11, 29 & n. 18 (marshaling). 
18. Jim's Brief appears to take this quote out of context. Rita did not testify 
that she didn't know what her agreement with the Trust was in terms of the basis for 
payment, but only in terms of the timing of payment with reference to the fact, as set forth 
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in her Exhibit 50, that the Trust didn't currently have the funds with which to pay her. 
See R. at 2027, Tr. p. 127 In. 13 to p. 128 ln.4. Rita's Brief refers many times to the fact 
that the Trust did not currently have the funds to pay what it agreed it owed her. See, e.g., 
Rita's Brief at 6-7 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts at 1fl3.g.), 8 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts at 1jl8.d.), 39, 42. 
19. Rita's Brief reflects Rita's testimony that she had check-writing authority at 
least twice. See Rita's Brief at 30 (marshaling), 32. 
20. Same as paragraph 10 above. 
21. Same as paragraph 10 above, except this time with derogatory hyperbole. 
22. Jim's Brief somewhat misstates the Record here. Rita did not testify at trial 
that she personally submitted the 2004 Ford Credit Application (Jim's Ex. 28), or that she 
"stood behind the information provided" therein. The only things the Record reflects are 
that Rita provided the information contained in the 2004 Ford Credit Application, and that 
at least some of that information was "a lie." R. at 2027, Tr. p. 166 In. 14 to p. 167 ln.2. 
The statement by Mr. Branch at lines 24 and 25 of page 166 of the Trial Transcript that 
"You told me in your deposition that, in fact, you agreed with everything that was in that 
document" is just that - his statement. It is not phrased in the form of a question, and 
Rita did not answered it in the affirmative. Rita's affirmative response follows Mr. 
Branch's next sentence, which this time is phrased as a question: "You provided the 
information for that document; is that true?" R. at 2027, Tr. p. 166 In. 25 to p. 167 ln.2. 
Contrary to the impression that Jim's Brief conveys here, Rita's Brief is replete with 
references to the facts that Rita was aware of the contents of the 2004 Ford Credit 
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Application at the time it was submitted; that she was aware that some of the information 
in it was not true; and that she authorized it to be submitted on her behalf anyway. See 
Rita's Brief at 9 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts at j^22), 10 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts at 1[24),16 
(marshaling), 20-21 & n.8, 25. For purposes of marshaling, Rita's Brief even takes as 
true the notion that Rita answered to the affirmative during her deposition testimony that 
she "agreed with everything that was in the [2004 Credit Application]." Rita's Brief at 16. 
23. The 2004 Ford Credit Application says what it says and speaks for itself. It 
makes no reference to the Trust. That is what Rita's Brief states and it implies nothing 
different. See Rita's Brief at 8-9 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts at TJ20), 15-16 (marshaling), 20, 24. 
The portion of the Trial Transcript cited by Jim's Brief, however, speaks to Rita's 
subjective intent of benefitting the Trust at the time she authorized the submission of the 
2004 Ford Credit Application. See R. at 2027, Tr. p.218 ln.23 to p.220 ln.19. This is also 
addressed in Paragraph 23 of her Statement of Relevant Facts. See Rita's Brief at 9-10. 
24. The assertions of fact in this paragraph of Jim's Brief are misleading. The 
fact that Rita was familiar with the purported September 2000 balance sheet for the Trust 
does not make it authenticated or its contents admissible. Even assuming that Rita was 
acting as the Trust's designated witness under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and that she qualified as a custodian of records for the Trust, Rita never 
authenticated this document as being a record made or kept in the ordinary course of the 
Trust's business for purposes of Utah Rule of Evidence 803(b). In fact, she testified just 
the opposite. See R. 2027, Tr. p.177 ln.3 to p.179 ln.18. Moreover, Rita certainly didn't 
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testify that this was a document that she had created for purposes of Utah Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2). See id. In short, this document was unauthenticated, its contents 
were pure hearsay, and Rita's objections to that effect should have been sustained by the 
Trial Court. Moreover, what the Trust may have been worth in September 2000 is only 
marginally relevant to whether it had sufficient liquidity to have paid Rita at any given 
time thereafter, especially at or around the time of trial, or to Rita's legal ability to tap 
into it. All of this, including the hearsay statement as to the value of the Trust in 
September 2000, was set forth and discussed in Rita's Brief. See Rita's Brief at 27 & 
n.15, 28-29 & nn.16-18 (marshaling), 30 & n.19 (marshaling), 31 & n.20 (marshaling). 
25. The assertions of fact in this paragraph of Jim's Brief are both misleading 
and argumentative. Jim would have us believe that Rita had discretionary control over 
the Trust during the period from May 2001 until January 2005, and that she used this 
discretion to pay $500.00-per-month gifts out to herself and her four siblings during this 
period rather than pay herself for working for the Trust. In fact, the evidence cited stands 
for just the opposite proposition: that one of the reasons that the Trust lacked sufficient 
liquidity to pay Rita was because her parents decided to undertake this gifting program 
leaving the Trust without sufficient liquidity; and that Rita did not have discretionary 
control over the Trust - not even becoming a co-trustee until March 2005.3 The extent of 
3
 See R. at 2027, Tr. p.122 Ins. 8-11 ("Well, that's part of it too because they were 
talked into giving everybody $500 a month when they sold their motel which was on 
payments, but that was just long as the payments were coming in on the motel." 
{emphasis added)); R. at 2028, Tr. p.232 ln.24 to p.233 ln.l ("Q: When did you first 
become a co-trustee of the Trust? A: March 2005."). 
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Rita's control over her parents' Trust, including her ability to decide to pay out gifts to 
herself and her siblings rather than paying herself, and whether the Trust had sufficient 
liquidity to pay Rita, are some of the Trial Court's findings that are challenged in this 
appeal. As a result, this is all set forth and discussed in detail in Rita's Brief. See, e.g., 
Rita's Brief at 6 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts at f 13.e.), 22-23 & n.l 1, 28 (marshaling), 29 & 
nn.16-18 (marshaling), 30 (marshaling) & 31 (marshaling). 
26. The fact that Rita's Financial Declarations were incomplete was stated and 
acknowledged repeatedly in Rita's Brief. See Rita's Brief at 16 (marshaling), 17, 42, 43. 
Moreover, Rita's general lack of credibility, as supported by her lack of disclosure in her 
Financial Declarations and her lack of candor in her deposition, has been conceded for 
purposes of this appeal. It is difficult to see how the fact that Rita didn't disclose her 
wage claim against her parents' Trust in her Financial Declarations is otherwise relevant 
to the Trial Court's finding that $3,800.00 per month in unpaid earnings should be 
imputed to her from July 1, 1998 to May 10, 2005. 
27. The Trial Court's findings and conclusions regarding the extent of Rita's 
control over her parents' Trust, her ability to pay herself, and whether she decided not to 
pay herself speak for themselves. Rita's Brief clearly points out these findings and 
conclusions, and then challenges them. See Rita's Brief at 11 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts at f27), 
27 & n.l5, 28 (marshaling), 29 (marshaling), 30 (marshaling), 31-32 & n.20 (marshaling). 
28. The assertion in this paragraph of Jim's Brief that Rita prepared the page of 
her Exhibit 22 that shows payments of $27,207.50 from the Trust for work performed 
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isn't supported by the Record, see R. at 2027, Tr. p.124 Ins.18-19 ("The second page is a 
computer printout from the accountant (inaudible) on checks that were paid for wages."), 
and the Trial Court made no finding to that effect. The facts that Rita compiled the pages 
that comprise her Exhibit 22, and that she hand wrote most of them, are, however, not 
disputed. See paragraph 10 above. 
29. This paragraph of Jim's Brief is somewhat misleading. When the part of 
the Trial Transcript that immediately precedes the portion cited in Jim's Brief is 
considered, it clearly shows that the only part of Rita's Exhibit 22 that Jim disputed 
during his testimony was with respect to the hours that he worked, not with respect to the 
hours that Rita worked or what she earned: 
The Court: And there are, just keep going by until you find a handwritten 
document that reflects or purports to reflect "hours worked by Jim Richins." 
The Witness: Okay. Let me find it here real quick. Okay, I found it. 
The Court: Was there a record kept of the time that you worked for the trust at the 
time that you were working it? 
The Witness: The hours that I worked at that Yasemite [sic Yosemite] Mine, I 
kept a record of those. They was left at the house when I was thrown out. And 
these records right here, I - this is Rita's handwriting and I'm sure she put this 
together right here. The Court: Okay. So you're disputing these specific 
numbers? 
The Witness: Yes. I don't think they're accurate, no. 
The Court: But you're, you, did you keep, you kept a separate record? 
The Witness: Only when I worked at the [Yosemite] Mine. Not when I worked on 
the Powell properties. These reflect the hours that I worked on the Powell 
properties which are inaccurate. There is nothing here showing when I worked at 
the [Yosemite] Mine. R. at 2028, Tr. p.386 ln.4 to p.387 ln.17. 
Thus, it is very clear that the only thing Jim was disputing was the accuracy of his hours, 
not Rita's. It also appears that Jim's dispute centered around the fact that his hours 
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working at the Yosemite Mine were not included with the hours he spent working on the 
Powell properties. In fact, Jim appeared to be on the verge of admitting that he had been 
paid indirectly through one or more of the checks that Rita's parents wrote out to her, as 
Rita had previously testified,4 when he was interrupted by the Court.5 Moreover, Jim's 
testimony actually corroborates Rita's testimony and her Exhibit 22 on several points, 
including that Jim had also worked for Rita's parents and that Jim, like Rita, was also 
supposed to be earning $12 per hour.6 Arguably, at least to some extent, the fact that Jim 
disputed the accuracy of his hours shown in Rita's Exhibit 22, and his assertion that he 
was never directly paid for this work, undermine the accuracy of Rita's hours also shown 
in her Exhibit 22. To the extent that this is true, counsel apologizes for not having 
included these facts in the Statement of Relevant Facts and in the initial marshaling in 
Rita's Brief, and respectfully requests the Court to treat them as so stated and marshaled. 
30. Again, the Trial Court found and concluded what it found and concluded 
with respect to Rita's control over the Trust, and this is set forth and discussed at length 
4
 See R. at 2027, Tr. 128 Ins. 10-18 ("Q: Did Jim ever do any work for the trust? 
A: There was some work. Q: Was he paid for the work that he did for the trust? A: Yes. 
Q: How much was he paid and what was the basis of his payment for the work he did for 
the trust? A: He was paid $12 an hour and was, he had them pay me."). Rita also later 
explained that the reason Jim had her parents pay her for his work was that he was 
"collecting unemployment at the time." R. at 2028, Tr. p.425 lns.3-12. 
5
 See R. at 2028, Tr. p.387 ln.22 to p.388 In.5 ("The Court: Okay, did you receive 
payment for that? The Witness: No. I've only received, if you look at the payment- The 
Court: And by payment, I mean did you receive cash or check or- The Witness: No, I 
have not."). 
6
 See R. at 2028, Tr. p.387 lns.20-21 ("John Powell hired me to work at $12 an 
hour."). 
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in Rita's Brief. See Rita's Brief at 11 (Stmt, of Rel. Facts at ^ 27), 28 (marshaling), 29 & 
nn.16, 18 (marshaling), 30 (marshaling), 31-32 & n.20. Once again, these are some of the 
Trial Court's findings and conclusions that Rita is challenging in this appeal. 
31. Other than the facts that the marital home was valued at $ 181,000.00, and 
that it was awarded to Rita, both of which are clearly set forth Rita's Brief, see pp. 11 
(Stmt, of Rel. Facts at TJ27.a.), 40 n.28, 41-42, the assertions of this paragraph of Jim's 
Brief are only marginally relevant to the legal question of whether the cumulative effect 
of the Trial Court's rulings was punitive as to Rita. Of course Rita wanted to be awarded 
the marital home. It's where she lives. Jim hadn't lived there since he was removed by a 
protective order. R. at 1704, 1706 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 
nn.l&2), Rita's Ex. 2. The marital home is located next door to Rita's mother's home. 
R. at 2027, Tr. p.98 Ins. 10-12. Rita didn't want to have to move, and she certainly didn't 
want Jim living next door to her mother while she lived somewhere else. 
32. The assertions of this paragraph of Jim's Brief are only marginally relevant. 
The Decree of Divorce says what it says. The issue is not whether the Decree of Divorce 
is punitive on its face. It is unlikely that any trial court judge would enter a divorce 
decree that is punitive on its face. Rita's Brief doesn't even assert that the Trial Court 
consciously intended to punish her for her "lies." Rita's Brief only asserts that some of 
reasoning underlying some of the Trial Court's rulings is flawed, and that the actual 
cumulative effect of those rulings is a Decree of Divorce that has a punitive effect on Rita 
- which is a question of law. 
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33. Again, the assertions of this paragraph of Jim's Brief are only marginally 
relevant. The Decree of Divorce says what it says, and Rita does not assert that it is 
punitive on its face. The issue is whether the cumulative effect of the Trial Court's 
rulings is punitive as to Rita, which is a question of law, and a divorce decree can have a 
punitive effect regardless of the size of the marital estate. 
34. Again, the assertions in this paragraph of Jim's Brief are only marginally 
relevant. The Decree of Divorce says what it says. Again, the issue is not whether the 
Decree of Divorce is punitive on its face, but whether the actual cumulative effect of the 
Trial Court's rulings was a decree that was punitive as to Rita, which is a question of law. 
II. Additional Assertions in Jim's Brief that are Not Supported by the Record. 
35. There is no support in the Record for the proposition asserted on page 3 of 
Jim's Brief that Rita's change in position prior to trial was caused by "fear[] that her 
scheme would be discovered." This is just speculation. Rita could just as easily have 
been motivated by a desire not to mislead the Trial Court. Jim simply has no basis for 
knowing Rita's subjective intent. 
36. Similarly, at page 4, Jim's Brief speculates without evidentiary basis that 
Rita's pre-trial disclosure of her accounting of the unpaid earnings owed to her by her 
parents' Trust was part of a "new strategy aimed at minimizing her compensation claim." 
37. Contrary to the assertions on page 4 of Jim's Brief, Rita did not bring this 
appeal because she is "upset" "merely because the [Trial] Court did not believe some of 
the evidence [she] 'created'." Rita's Brief clearly shows that she has brought this appeal 
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because she believes that the Trial Court committed errors that have a significant negative 
impact on her, and she asks this Court to help correct them. Moreover, there is no support 
in the Record for the notion that Rita "created" her Exhibit 50. 
38. Contrary to the assertion at pages 4-5 of Jim's Brief, the Trial Court never 
found that Rita's Exhibit 50 was either untruthful or unreliable. 
39. As already discussed at length in paragraph 29 above, contrary to the 
assertion at page 15 of Jim's Brief, Jim did not "[make] it clear that he did not agree with 
[Rita's Exhibit 22fs] content or reliability," except as to its accuracy with respect to the 
hours that he himself had worked and his assertion that he was never directly paid. 
40. Once again, as already demonstrated at length in paragraph 29 above, 
contrary to the assertions at page 21 of Jim's Brief, Jim never did dispute the accuracy of 
Rita's Exhibit 22 as it pertained to the hours she worked and the earnings she was owed 
by her parents' Trust prior to the parties' separation. This assertion does not become 
more true just because it is repeated many times. Moreover, Jim appeared to be about to 
admit that he'd been paid indirectly when he was interrupted by the Trial Court. 
41. While it can be true that "it is a crime to knowingly provide false 
information to a lending institution," as asserted without citation at page 23 of Jim's 
Brief, this is generally true only if the lender or the loan is insured by either the federal or 
a state government. As the financing subsidiary for Ford Motor Co., it is not likely that 
Ford Credit, or this auto loan, were governmentally insured. Moreover, there would not 
even be a finding of fraud in tort absent damages suffered, and it was undisputed that the 
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auto loan obtained pursuant to the 2004 Ford Credit Application was paid in full. 
42. The assertion at pages 23-24 of Jim's Brief with respect to Rita's post-
separation earnings being at the same rate as what the Trial Court imputed to her is not 
supported by the post-trial evidence to which he points. The $171,500 in unpaid earnings 
from June 2005 through June 2009 set forth in the financial statement submitted by Rita 
in support of her Undertaking on Appeal (attempting to forestall Jim's collection 
activities), already includes the 10% of the Trust's monthly rental income. This should be 
clear from the fact that the immediately preceding item on this same financial statement is 
the $118,700.00 owed to Rita for her services to the Trust from August 2002 to May 
2005, which is the same number (rounded off) from her Exhibits 22 and 50, and which 
also already includes the 10% of gross monthly rents. See Rita's Exhibit 22. Moreover, 
the Trial Court's error here doesn't go so much to the monthly amount of the income that 
it imputed to Rita as it does to the period of time over which it was imputed. By 
reference to the 2004 Ford Credit Application, the Trial Court started imputing income to 
Rita as of July 1, 1998, while Rita maintains that she didn't start working for her parents 
until about October 2000 (more than two years later), and that she was already paid some 
$27,207.59 for the early work she did, making the relevant period start in August 2002 
(more than four years later than the Trial Court imputed). In this regard it is also worth 
noting that Jim's Brief is eager to use the post-trial evidence contained in Rita's 
Undertaking on Appeal, but wants the Court to ignore the 2003 Ford Credit Application, 
that he placed into the Record at least four times prior to trial, see Jim's Brief at 16 & n.3, 
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39, 40-41; R. at 324, 347, 428 & 452; that he listed three separate times on his exhibit 
lists; see R. at 1616, 1632,1633, and that, along with Rita's Exhibit 50, corroborates her 
testimony and her Exhibit 22 as to her start date for the Trust and her unpaid earnings. 
43. On page 27, Jim's Brief asserts without citation that the "[Trial] Court 
clearly found that there was NO offset to its determination of compensation owed to the 
Appellant by the Family Trust." No such finding appears in the Record. The Trial Court 
specifically found that Rita's assertion of the receipt of $27,207.59 from her parents's 
Trust (as shown on the computer print-out page of Rita's Exhibit 22), and the expenditure 
of that money for marital purposes, were undisputed, but failed to deduct that amount 
from the unpaid earnings it imputed to Rita. See R. at 1707, 1719 (Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order at }^13 and n.5, ^ [60). 
44. The "facts" listed on pages 27 through 30 of Jim's Brief are substantially 
just a reiteration of what has already been adequately address above. 
45. The assertion on page 31 of Jim's Brief that Rita "presented NO evidence to 
corroborate [her Exhibit 22] other than her own testimony" simply isn't true. As is 
already discussed in some detail in Rita's Brief, her Exhibit 50 substantially corroborates 
her trial testimony, as reflected in her Exhibit 22. as does the 2003 Ford Credit 
Application; and the Record contains no indication that the Trial Court disbelieved 
anything in Rita's Exhibit 50. Moreover, as already discussed above, Jim's testimony 
also corroborates portions of Rita's testimony and her Exhibit 22. 
46. Page 32 of Jim's Brief substantially overstates the contents of footnote 14 
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on page 26 of Rita's brief. This footnote does not make it "clear that Appellant herself is 
unable to make the calculations [in her Exhibit 22] square up." Rather, it acknowledges 
the fact that part of the $27,207.59 that was paid to Rita probably included some of Jim's 
earnings, but that the amount that could be attributed thereto was de minimus. 
47. Page 3 8 of Jim's Brief asserts without any evidentiary support that Rita has 
been violating her fiduciary duties to her parents "for years," and also asserts, again 
without out any evidentiary support, that Rita's parents' Trust is "[Rita's] own Trust." 
48. Page 43 of Jim's Brief substantially misstates Rita's position. Rita has 
never taken the position that "she has NO value in the compensation claim awarded her." 
Rita's position at trial and before this Court has consistently been that the amount of her 
unpaid earnings that accumulated prior to the parties' separation is not as great as the 
Trial Court found based on the 2004 Ford Credit Application. 
49. Contra the statement on page 44 of Jim's Brief, Rita didn't withdraw her 
alimony claim "under oath." It was her trial counsel during Jim's deposition. R. at 1550. 
50. The assertions on page 47 of Jim's Brief, that Rita was "awarded the 
$120,000.00 in cash 'loans' that she could, and probably already has converted to her 
ownership" are not supported by citation or the Record. First, no loans of any amount 
were "awarded" in the Decree of Divorce. Indeed, it is hard to see how one can be 
"awarded" a liability. Second, the only loan that existed at the time of trial was a $50,000 
loan made to Rita by her mother after the parties' separation. R. at 2027, Tr. p. 157 lns.2-
16. Finally, the post-trial $70,000 "advance" does not specify whether it is against Rita 
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claim for earnings, either pre- or post-separation, or her personal injury claim. R. at 2024. 
III. Rita's Trial Exhibit No. 50 Did Not Need to Be "Agreed to" to Be 
Uncontroverted, It Simply Needed Not to Have Been Controverted. 
Contrary to the assertion on page 13 of Jim's Brief that Rita's appeal rests entirely 
on her Exhibit 22, it more clearly appears that this appeal turns on the Trial Court's 
treatment of, or rather its failure to properly treat, Rita's Exhibit 50. Although Jim's Brief 
does not contest that Rita's Trial Exhibits 22 and 50 were admitted into evidence without 
objection,7 it does make the curious argument that because "they were NOT agreed to as 
to [being] truthful[, they] did not therefore automatically become uncontested facts." 
Jim's Brief at 5. It is axiomatic, however, that in order to be uncontroverted, evidence 
does not need to be "agreed to" by the opposing party, it simply needs to not be 
controverted by any other evidence that is admitted. And, the fact is that, although Rita's 
Exhibit 22, standing alone, may have been somewhat controverted to the extent that it 
was simply demonstrative of her testimony (in light of the Trial Court's findings as to 
Rita's credibility) and to the extent that Jim disputed the accuracy of his hours reported 
therein, Rita's Exhibit 50, remained entirely uncontroverted at trial,8 and it, along with the 
7
 At this point, Jim has waived any right to object to their admission because he 
did not do so before the Trial Court. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Commrs. v. Ferrebee, 844 
P.2d 308, 314 (Utah 1992) (objection to taking option agreement into evidence waived 
because not asserted before trial court); Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21,1fl[6-85 44 
P.3d 704, 706 (Because defendant waived her authentication and hearsay objections, 
letters written by the parties' mother were properly in evidence before the trial court and 
part of the record before the Utah Supreme Court.). 
8
 While it might be argued that Rita's Exhibit 50 was contradicted by her prior 
deposition testimony to the effect that she was not owed money by the Trust, to do so 
would be to adopt inconsistent reasoning in that it would be accepting Rita's prior 
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2003 Ford Credit Application, substantially corroborate Rita's Exhibit 22 and her trial 
testimony on the issue of how much she was owed by her mother's Trust for services 
provided prior to her separation from Jim. Moreover, as also discussed more fully in 
paragraph 29 above, instead of substantially controverting Rita's Exhibit 22 on this issue, 
Jim's trial testimony actually at least partially corroborates it. 
While it is true as Jim's Brief asserts that when a trial court serves as the finder of 
fact it has "considerable discretion to assign relative weight to the evidence before it[, 
which] includes the right to minimize or even disregard certain evidence," State v. 
Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 156 Utah Adv. Rpt. 26 
(Utah 1990), a trial court cannot, however, "go so far as to [] refuse to be guided by 
credible, uncontradicted evidence." De Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 137, 369 P.2d 290, 
293 Utah 1962), cert denied sub norn. Noble v. De Vas, 371 U.S. 821, 83 S.Ct. 37, 9 
L.Ed.2d 61 (1962). For instance, in U.S. West Commns., Inc. v Pub. Svc. Commn., 901 
P.2d 270 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the Public Service Commission 
"acted arbitrarily and capriciously" in ignoring the uncontradicted testimony of U.S. 
West's witness that the services provided by U.S. West and one of its subsidiaries were 
not duplicative. Id. at 275, citing De Vas, and quoting Jones v. Calif. Packing Corp., 121 
Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah 1952) (a finder of fact cannot simply "disbelieve or 
disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence."). See also, WWC Holding Co., 
deposition testimony as true for one purpose while simultaneously rejecting it as false for 
another purpose. Moreover, such a result would only serve to discourage litigants who 
had been less than candid during discovery from coming clean at or before trial. 
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Inc. v Pub. Svc. Commn. 2002 UT 23,1J8, 44 P.3d 714, 718, ("in evaluating the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we will not sustain a decision which ignores uncontradicted, 
competent, credible evidence to the contrary."), quoting Harken Southwest Corp. v. Bd. 
of Oil Gas & Mining. 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 1996). In this case, the Trial Court 
admitted but substantially ignored and refused to be guided by Rita's Exhibit 50, which 
was credible and uncontroverted at trial. 
Rita's Exhibit 50 is a letter from David Ray Carver, attorney for Rita's mother, 
Helen Powell, who is the primary trustee over and sole current beneficiary of the Trust. 
In this letter, Mr. Carver confirms that he and Rita's mother reviewed Rita's claim for 
$118,699.44 in compensation from the Trust (Rita's Exhibit 22); that Mrs. Powell 
confirmed that the hours claimed by Rita were reasonable for the time period of August 
2000 through May 10, 2005; and that Mrs. Powell accepted the $118,699.44 amount as 
payment in full for this period. Moreover, Mr. Carver confirms that Mrs. Powell {i.e., the 
Trust) didn't currently have enough liquid assets to pay the agreed upon amount. Mr. 
Carver is a respected member in good standing with the Utah State Bar. There was no 
challenge to his credibility. Quite simply, Rita's Exhibit 50 is credible, uncontroverted 
and substantially corroborates the information contained in her testimony and her Exhibit 
22, and the Trial Court should have been guided by its contents, but was not. As a result, 
the Trial Court should be reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
IV. The Trial Court Went Too Far In Punishing Rita for Her Pre-trial "Lies." 
In essence, Jim's Brief argues over and over again that "Rita lied" and "the Trial 
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Court gave her what she deserved." While Rita concedes for purposes of this appeal that 
she was not entirely honest with respect to the facts of this case during the discovery 
phase of the proceedings below, she maintains that the Record shows that she came clean 
before and at trial. This gives rise to the policy question of how much a litigant should be 
punished, especially in a divorce case where punitive decrees are not permitted, for 
failing to cooperate in discovery but coming clean by the time of trial. 
The sanction of an award of attorney fees to the other party is clearly appropriate. 
Hence the lack of a challenge in this appeal to the Trial Court's award of attorney fees to 
Jim below. Moreover, Jim certainly would have been within his rights to have requested 
a continuance of the trial in this case to reopen discovery and address the new issues 
presented by Rita's Exhibits 22 and 50. Instead, the Record reflects that Jim chose to 
proceed to trial and to use Rita's Exhibit 22 to convince the Trial Court that she "lied" 
during discovery. Jim was so successful with this strategy that he persuaded the Trial 
Court that Rita's testimony was so lacking in credibility that her Exhibit 22 should be 
substantially disregarded, and that the Trial Court should instead adopt the contents of the 
2004 Ford Credit Application. In fact, Jim's strategy was too successful because it also 
caused the Trial Court to substantially ignore the other important piece of evidence that 
Rita produced: her Exhibit 50, which was credible, uncontroverted at trial and 
substantially corroborated the information contained in her trial testimony and her Exhibit 
22. As discussed above, this was something that the Trial Court just could not do. 
A review of the important issues decided against Rita in this case is somewhat 
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astounding. The Trial Court denied her motion to reinstate her claim for alimony, 
refusing even to let her make a proffer for the record on that issue; it found that the Trust 
owed her close to three times as much in unpaid pre-separation earnings than what the 
Trust agreed owed her; it refused to deduct the $27,207.59 that it had already determined 
was undisputed as having been paid out and spent on marital expenses; it awarded Rita's 
claim for unpaid earnings to her but ordered her to immediately compensate Jim for half 
of the imputed amount, treating the imputed earnings as though they were a fully liquid 
asset despite the uncontroverted evidence that they were not. In so doing the Trial Court 
also chose to ignore the fiduciary duties Rita owed by law to her mother as her trustee and 
attorney-in-fact and instead concluded that Rita had unfettered control over the Trust; that 
she could have paid herself at some point in the past if she'd wanted to; and that, as a 
result, she should now bear the burden of the Trust's current illiquidity. Finally, because 
the Trial Court should have known that it was not awarding Rita enough liquid funds for 
her to pay the award to Jim, and because it was undisputed that the Trust lacked the 
present liquidity, it also should have known that the funds would have to come from the 
sale of the marital home.9 When is it enough? Rita respectfully submits that a divorce 
9
 Paragraph 18 of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order suggests that the parties have other assets that could be used to "offset[] the value 
of [Jim's] share of [Rita's] imputed income from the Trust," but does not indicate what 
those "other assets" might be. R. at 1709. In addition, while it is true, as Jim's Brief 
states, that in October 2005 there was a preliminary division of some $400,000.00 
between the parties, see R. at 154-159, in light of the disabling injury to Rita's dominant 
hand that left her unable to work in her prior trade of carpentry and gave rise to her 
personal injury claim against the Trust, see R. at 2027, Tr. p.188 Ins.3-13, it is no surprise 
that by the time the Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
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litigant's punishment for a lack of candor during discovery should end with an award of 
attorney fees to the other party and the granting of an opportunity to conduct further 
discovery; and that the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and 
its Decree of Divorce, in this case simply go too far. 
V. Jim Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees Because Rita's Appeal Is Not Frivolous. 
This is not an appeal from a contract or a tort case, nor is it a case where a party 
below was awarded attorney fees pursuant to a statute like the Valcarce case cited in 
Jim's Brief. This is an appeal from a divorce case, and Jim was not awarded attorney fees 
below for prevailing, but for having to deal with unnecessary discovery motions, etc. 
none of which are addressed in this appeal. Moreover, the issues that are raised in this 
appeal are significant and non-frivolous. As a result, Jim should not be awarded attorney 
fees on appeal, regardless of the Court's decisions on the merits of the issues raised. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the above reasons, together with those stated in Rita's Opening Brief, the 
Court should reverse and remand this case for further proceedings in the Trial Court as to 
the issues of: (1) the amount of Rita's claim for unpaid earnings that accumulated prior to 
the parties' separation; and (2) the treatment of Rita's claim thereto based on the Trust's 
present lack of liquidity, with no award of attorney fees to either party. 
some three years later that Rita would have exhausted much if not all of her share on 
living expenses and attorney fees in this hotly contended case. The same holds true for 
the $50,000.00 loan made to Rita by her mother in September 2005 shortly after the 
parties separated. See R. at 2027, Tr. p.157 ln.2 to p.158 ln.6. 
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Salt Lake City Office 
Westgate Business Center 
180 South 300 West, Suite 218 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-3130 
Carver & lA/edt, o t . cZ .C 
Attorneys and Counselors at Law 
DAVID RAY CARVER 
ORSON B. WEST 
RECEIVED JUL 2 9 
Kavsville Office 
Comers Professional Bldg. 
93 South Mam, Suite 2 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Telephone: (801) 547-9262 
My 28,2008 
Mr. J. David Milliner 
3838 So. West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Re: Helen M. Powell 
$118,699.44 Claim by Rita Richins 
Dear Mr. Milliner 
I have reviewed with my client, Helen M. Powell, the claim in the amount of $118,699.44 
that you submitted on behalf of Rita Richins. Helen confirmed that Rita did a lot of work for her 
and Helen felt that the hours listed for Rita of 10,80933 hours was reasonable for the time period 
listed from August 2000 through May 10,2005. The payment by Helen of the amount of 
$118,699.44 will be payment in full for that time period. 
Helen does not have enough liquid assets at the present time to immediately pay the entire 
$ 118,699-44. However, she will work with her accountant to pay what she can now and then she 
will pay the balance to Rita as soon as she can convert some of her fixed assets into cash* Please 
be patient with my client for a few months while she obtains the rest of the funds she will need to 
pay the balance she owes to Rita, 
Very truly yours, 
^ ^ ^ 
David Ray Carver 
cc: Helen M> Powell 
n PETITIONER PYUIUIT 
APPENDIX C 
I \Clients\Richins, Rita, Appeal\Reply Brief wpd 
=H; Ford Credit 
St l l t J i Utfc Oniy — Osifcrirjg *•. 
APPLICATION STATEMENT (Please Print) 
CLASS COD£: U RcJ AJL U P.CL U OTHEft 
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i JDJW Applicant: 
Prima xy ADphnan'. I n » • - . . 
j J J Application li 10? JOT* CT60JI WJb pf'^Brj' «p;AC3Jil oi £ l is tJUEttsOiDI. 
Primary spptaaiss :i jeiying on yiiu 1o) incoms to etimony. crotf iuppon. a SEpziaiD 
j rnbrnMOiznU' 01 cr; your snscxxro 01 ssbbts i t irifc jjasa, lot f(si>h>9nen) o1 Hit atoH jequtasd. 
j 1! Josw Applicant. r-ife3EuwiHn^  i& feppiicanr. 
j O S • JteiMot D P • Fa«ft« 
S D ° ' OJ,'iDl 
Ua«iff* /j J/-, U 
Orifc of ginr* 
Wcht n s PilSl )4ZffiC /J / * ^ MxMfc Item! • •*• 
h3tg-5b So:. Sec. «n. 53$-$b^5<T i Dover's Ucims* ito. $nd State 1 Q r m SPOILS UT 
Phyypjj j^odjip (Humpsr. SlftEi-AjJfcnmuni} WT^rVSSSk r'fesf Dr 
Silling AcJdiess ^Nupifcoj. S)rfcel. AD&nmeni. P.O. Jtox'j 
TnflnrsVllle. ttr ^ u ? ? 
Coumy y-
Xcll Phone dumber 
Phone in j Q Y C S 
Applicant
 2 r - | » o 
Home? d L-> ' ° 
Phone fclumbei 
Al£B CpOC 
lE^GwHomB 3Qlswo9¥Bth s Q O f n / B ^ w j Uvt-d Thbrfi 
Outright Motrin Home 
I <|DT> ?^ lj$ " &t *j'4 4) | 2 D £ o ) t i n s Hwnfi 4 Dl^tsngfiifiminB v/.. D 'Aw 
OMici ffione i&imoiii 
fS3ft a s ^ - a ^ )%&? x<rt-J^ b 
Name and Addiess 01 LsndJoid or KtongapB Holder 
\A OlA Y", 
EmaiJ Addies. • Personal Email AiidR£& • Buarasws 
Phone Mumbei of JUendJorri 01 idonjraoo Hoidoi 
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„„ "^ ^
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CredxV- U/u'gn 
decking & Savings 3 Q Savings Only 
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Creditors ttenve and C%/Sl£ia 
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Pi&me and Address of .•Applicant's Naaresl RolsfoBsfF hends .Not m Household y_ - _ r> / * , <,Lrf<r.s, 7UUL 
Oale^ 
Opened 
UontiTlv 3 UnpBid 
PnrL Araourt } fiaiance 
"Tore** Prvci, 
t3)
 E r i n kovoo) / <&/& 4fT m^st^ a-cu<r$?fc 
For the purpose of securing credit from you, 1 certify that the above informatio 
A?sTcoa°e{g0f 3^Ttfr 
W ^ P e l i lEitonsrwp 
rn cni 
Pnone Wo. H ^ / , 
AreB C o d e \ l ^ t ?)?5rsi.^ 
pnons No. 
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<H used venicio) 
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